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THE NEW TATE LETTER:  
FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
AND THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY FIX 
Luke Ryan* 
 
Our constitutional system was designed—and indeed works better—when 
the President and his subordinates must answer to people who don’t work 
for them, particularly those in Congress and the courts.1 
 
Plaintiffs sometimes bring civil lawsuits in U.S. federal courts against 
officials or ex-officials of foreign governments accused of committing 
atrocities abroad.  In these types of cases, the foreign individuals will 
almost certainly invoke the affirmative defense of foreign official immunity.  
In the 2010 decision, Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court unanimously 
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)—a 1976 statute 
governing the immunity of foreign states—did not control judicial 
determination of a foreign individual’s request for immunity.  Instead, the 
Court said that foreign officials may be entitled to immunity as a matter of 
federal common law.  Because of the sensitive foreign policy implications of 
these types of cases, the executive branch—specifically the State 
Department—has aggressively asserted control over all foreign official 
immunity requests.  In 2012, in the so-called “Rosenberg Statement” and 
“Koh Letter,” the Justice Department and Legal Adviser to the State 
Department, Harold Hongju Koh, declared that (1) federal courts must 
refrain from deciding any foreign official immunity request that was not 
first presented to the State Department and (2) it was for the Executive, not 
the courts, to evaluate whether a foreign individual acted in an official 
capacity. 
While the Executive is certainly the branch of government with principal 
responsibility for foreign affairs, the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement 
represent executive branch overreach into judicial supervision of a federal 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2002, University of 
Virginia.  The author is profoundly grateful to Professor Thomas H. Lee for his guidance and 
encouragement and is especially thankful to a courageous team who gave him the 
inspiration, joy, and resolve necessary to make this project a reality. 
 
 1. Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword to MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, 
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS:  THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISOR, at xvi (2010). 
1774 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
lawsuit.  Judicial deference to the Executive on foreign official immunity 
calls may be proper; blind obedience is not.  In fact, such unilateral control 
ultimately hurts the State Department itself, which must balance complex 
and countervailing foreign policy interests.  So how should the Executive’s 
power play be answered?  Despite the Supreme Court’s reference to judge-
made federal common law in Samantar, this Note argues that the tug-of-war 
between the executive and judicial branches requires congressional action 
because the courts are in disarray, with some already having acquiesced to 
executive control.  The current disorder is a striking replay of what 
happened in the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in the late 1950s 
and 1960s in the aftermath of the 1952 Tate Letter—an earlier dispatch 
from a different State Department Legal Advisor that sparked such 
confusion in the federal common law of foreign sovereign immunity that 
Congress was compelled to intervene with the FSIA.  This Note concludes 
with a model statute that Congress should consider enacting. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1775 
I.  THE ORIGINS OF DISORDER:  CONFUSION AND DISAGREEMENT IN 
THE CURRENT FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL 
IMMUNITY .................................................................................... 1777 
A.  Foreign Official Immunity As a Matter of Federal Common 
Law ........................................................................................ 1779 
B.  The Executive Upsets the Balance .......................................... 1781 
C.  Confusion in the Courts .......................................................... 1783 
II.  THE HISTORY OF A SOLUTION:  FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AS AN ANALOGY TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT ............................ 1787 
A.  The Roots of Foreign Sovereign and Foreign Official 
Immunity in American Jurisprudence ................................... 1788 
B.  The Tate Letter and Conflict in the Doctrine of Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity .............................................................. 1790 
C.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ..................... 1792 
III.  THE GRACEFUL EXIT:  AGAINST EXECUTIVE BRANCH MONOPOLY 
OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS .................. 1795 
A.  Status- and Conduct-Based Immunities .................................. 1796 
B.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry and Executive Authority Over Foreign 
Affairs .................................................................................... 1797 
C.  Hoffman and Ex parte Peru Under the Restrictive Theory of 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity ................................................. 1799 
IV.  THE FIX:  THE BEST SOLUTION GIVES AUTHORITY TO THE 
EXPERTS ....................................................................................... 1801 
A.  Status-Based Immunity to the Executive ................................. 1802 
B.  Conduct-Based Immunity to the Judiciary .............................. 1802 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1804 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................ 1805 
2016] A STATUTORY FIX TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY  1775 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 26, 2008, under a nearly moonless night sky, ten members 
of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group2 crouched aboard a small 
dinghy as it moved across the inky darkness of the Arabian Sea.3  The men 
had abandoned their homes in the mountain villages of Eastern Pakistan and 
embarked on a one-way journey to the Indian coastline to “kill 
relentlessly.”4  Stained with blood after murdering the crew of an Indian 
fishing boat, the terrorists raced toward the darkened beach of the world’s 
fourth largest city clutching automatic rifles, grenades, and satellite 
phones.5  When their dinghy pushed ashore at a fisherman’s slum in 
Mumbai’s Back Bay, they ran into the bustling commercial capital to 
conduct one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in history.6  Over the 
course of four days, the world watched as Indian authorities scrambled to 
counterattack, and the terrorists methodically killed 166 people.7 
The Mumbai attackers were guided to their targets by the detailed 
surveillance work of a U.S. citizen.8  For nearly two years, David Coleman 
Headley had traveled around Mumbai, using a camera and pocket-sized 
Global Positioning System (GPS) to discreetly gather information about the 
Indian security apparatus and map out the scenes of mass murder.9  In 2009, 
Headley was arrested in Chicago’s O’Hare Airport and charged with aiding 
and abetting the murder of U.S. nationals.10  He quickly confessed to his 
role in the Mumbai attacks.11  In interviews with American and Indian 
authorities, Headley revealed that he and the LeT attackers had received 
money and other material support from agents of the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the secretive Pakistani spy agency organized 
under Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense.12  Based on the information Headley 
 
 2. LeT is a Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist organization that has conducted 
numerous attacks against Indian government and civilian targets inside both countries. See 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ 
let.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/TX46-8EXP].  On December 20, 2001, LeT 
was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Secretary of State pursuant to 
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Individuals and Entities Designated 
by the State Department Under E.O. 13224, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/ 
rls/other/des/143210.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/THK4-5SYR]. 
 3. See CATHY SCOTT-CLARK & ADRIAN LEVY, THE SIEGE:  68 HOURS INSIDE THE TAJ 
HOTEL 1–3 (2013). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 3, 137; see also Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 338 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 8. See SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, supra note 3, at 34; see also Government’s Position 
Paper As to Sentencing Factors at 3–4, United States v. Headley, No. 09 CR 830 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 22, 2013), 2013 WL 951595. 
 9. See Government’s Position Paper, supra note 8, at 3–4; SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, 
supra note 3, at 55–56. 
 10. See Government’s Position Paper, supra note 8, at 4. 
 11. See id. at 7–9. 
 12. See id. at 8–9; SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, supra note 3, at xvi, 45, 53. 
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provided, the Justice Department issued an indictment against the ISI 
official who Headley had identified as his primary contact.13 
When the victims of the Mumbai attacks filed an action in the Eastern 
District of New York against the ISI and two of its directors, the Pakistani 
government asserted immunity and petitioned the State Department to 
recommend that protection to the court.14  The executive branch obliged,15 
and in the so-called “Rosenberg Statement,”16 it recommended dismissal of 
the allegations against the ISI under the statutory doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity17 and dismissal of the allegations against the ISI 
officials under the federal common law doctrine of foreign official 
immunity.18  The statement declared that the immunity determinations were 
binding on the court.19  More significant, however, was the second to last 
page of the document, where the Executive asserted control over all future 
foreign official immunity determinations when it wrote: 
[I]t is for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether the 
conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official’s official capacity.20 
And, 
[B]ecause a foreign state’s request for immunity on behalf of an official 
itself has foreign relations implications, courts should ensure that the 
Executive Branch has been notified of and had an opportunity to consider 
such a request before ruling on the immunity issue.  Indeed, for that 
reason, a foreign state’s request for an official’s immunity should first be 
presented to the Department of State, not to the court.21 
These controversial assertions highlight the disarray that currently exists 
regarding determinations of foreign official immunity by the courts.22  
Unfortunately, this discord is not easily resolved because the doctrine of 
foreign official immunity involves the competing responsibilities of the 
 
 13. See Second Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-
4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 1938505; Government’s Position Paper, supra note 8, 
at 9. 
 14. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
980 F. Supp. 2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 10-CV-05381 (DLI)), ECF No. 35 [hereinafter 
Rosenberg Statement] [perma.cc/JW9C-AUNL]. 
 17. Foreign sovereign immunity is synonymous with foreign state immunity. 
 18. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 2, 7. 
 19. See id. at 1 (“[T]he Department of State has determined that the former Directors 
General of the ISI . . . enjoy immunity, a determination that is not subject to judicial 
review.”). 
 20. Id. at 9–10. 
 21. Id. at 9 n.5. 
 22. See infra Part I.  Previously, the Executive had merely claimed “the primary role in 
determining the immunity of foreign officials” without making such an explicit assertion of 
total control. Statement of Interest of the United States at 5, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 
1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011), aff’d, 699 F.3d 763 
(4th Cir. 2012) (No. 04-CV-01360 (LMB)), ECF No. 147; see also Harold Hongju Koh, 
Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar:  A United States Government Perspective, 44 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1147 (2011). 
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executive and judicial branches, and the Constitution does not provide a 
clear answer.23  Therefore, a solution most likely requires action by the 
third branch of government:  Congress.24  Fortunately, the analogous 
history of foreign sovereign immunity provides a useful roadmap to a 
pragmatic solution for the current disarray in the doctrine of foreign official 
immunity.25  In 1976, after years of uncertainty and tension sparked by a 
different—yet surprisingly similar—statement of exclusive power from the 
Executive,26 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act27 
(FSIA) and brought order to the immunity doctrine that protects foreign 
states and their instrumentalities from suit in U.S. courts.28  The statute was 
a remarkable success and serves as a model for the current conflict.29 
This Note examines the federal common law of foreign official immunity 
in the aftermath of the Rosenberg Statement and suggests a statutory fix for 
the current confusion in the doctrine.  Part I outlines the modern law of 
foreign official immunity and the overlapping constitutional responsibilities 
that give rise to conflict between the executive and judicial branches, as 
well as the resulting confusion and discord among the courts.  Part II 
investigates the analogous history of foreign sovereign immunity and its 
legislative solution.  Part III analyzes the Executive’s foreign affairs power 
and its authority to assert control over determinations of foreign official 
immunity.  Finally, Part IV uses this new understanding to propose a 
division of authority between the executive and judicial branches that 
employs the expertise and constitutional authority of each.  This Note 
concludes with an argument in favor of a Foreign Official Immunities Act 
and an appendix containing a proposed statute. 
I.  THE ORIGINS OF DISORDER:  CONFUSION AND DISAGREEMENT 
IN THE CURRENT FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
This part examines the disorder that has arisen in the current doctrine of 
foreign official immunity.  In 2010, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the FSIA does not apply to the immunity of foreign officials, but left 
open the possibility that those individuals could be awarded immunity 
under federal common law.30  The Court did not, however, establish how 
foreign official immunity determinations should be made.31  In the five 
 
 23. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704, 704 (2012). 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 
1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012)). 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
 29. See infra APPENDIX. 
 30. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010). 
 31. See id.; see also Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and Executive Power, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 885–86 (2011); Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity 
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years since that landmark decision, the Executive has asserted primary 
control over the doctrine,32 and, predictably,33 the courts have struggled—
and failed—to apply a consistent standard.34  In the summer of 2015, a 
court in the Southern District of New York rejected the Executive’s 
questionable assertion of control in the Rosenberg Statement and rendered 
an immunity determination that was not presented to the State Department 
in the first instance.35  The court’s decision highlights one unsettled aspect 
of a federal common law doctrine that needs repair. 
Foreign official immunity determinations are difficult legal questions 
because the doctrine involves both the intersection of international and 
domestic law and the competing constitutional demands of the Executive 
and Judiciary.36  Moreover, a court determination of nonimmunity in a case 
against a foreign official risks ruptures in relations with the official’s 
country.37  This is particularly problematic when the foreign country in 
question is a powerful one or an important ally.38  Accordingly, some legal 
scholars argue that the Executive has a dominant role to play in recognizing 
and awarding foreign immunities because the determinations are integral to 
U.S. foreign policy,39 and the Executive has plenary power over foreign 
affairs.40  Other scholars, however, believe that the Executive has no place 
intruding on a legal question that is properly before the courts.41  They fear 
 
Determinations in U.S. Courts:  The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 
915, 917 (2011). 
 32. See infra Part I.B. 
 33. See Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589, 590 (2011); infra Part II.B. 
 34. See infra Part I.C.  Courts are split on (1) a foreign official’s right to immunity for 
violations of international law, and (2) the amount of deference that is owed to executive 
branch suggestions of immunity. Compare Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716, at 
*6 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016), and Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773, 777 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“The State Department’s determination regarding conduct-based immunity, by contrast, is 
not controlling [and] officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official 
immunity for [international law] violations.”), with Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 23 
(2d Cir. 2014) (“‘[I]n the common-law context, we defer to the Executive’s determination of 
the scope of immunity’ and ‘[a] claim premised on the violation of [international law] does 
not withstand foreign [official] immunity.’” (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d 
Cir. 2009))). 
 35. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), 2015 WL 
4879070, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015). 
 36. See Keitner, supra note 23, at 704. 
 37. See infra Part II.C. 
 38. See infra Part II.C. 
 39. The argument suffers when executive determinations in favor of (or against) 
immunity are used to advance foreign policy objectives because it means that the legal rights 
of private party litigants are decided on political and/or nonlegal grounds. See infra Part II.B. 
 40. See John B. Bellinger III, The Dog That Caught the Car:  Observations on the Past, 
Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts 
Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 825 (2011); Koh, supra note 22, at 1147; see 
also Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 41. See Rutledge, supra note 31, at 909; Wuerth, supra note 31, at 975 (arguing that “the 
practice of binding executive branch immunity determinations lacks solid constitutional 
footing” and “executive control of immunity determinations has demonstrated functional 
disadvantages”); see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012). 
2016] A STATUTORY FIX TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY  1779 
that immunities will be granted by the State Department for political 
reasons due to diplomatic pressure from allies, for example, or as 
bargaining chips with countries that have tense relations with the United 
States.42  The underlying concern is that determinations that should be 
made by the Judiciary under the rule-of-law end up being discretionary 
political calls.43  The resulting conflict produces a muddled doctrine, 
unclear standards, and a legal system that leaves parties unsure whether 
U.S. courts are available to resolve ordinary legal disputes against foreign 
individuals.44  This part examines the recent history of foreign official 
immunity to determine how the doctrine deteriorated so quickly—a mere 
five years after the Samantar decision. 
A.  Foreign Official Immunity 
As a Matter of Federal Common Law 
In November 2004, a class action was filed in the Eastern District of 
Virginia against a former high-ranking official of the government of 
Somalia.45  The plaintiffs alleged that Mohamed Ali Samantar had 
facilitated widespread torture and extrajudicial killing in Somalia in the late 
1980s.46  Samantar’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds was granted 
when the district court decided that he was an “agency or instrumentality” 
of Somalia and entitled to protection under the FSIA.47  On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit reversed Samantar’s dismissal and held the FSIA did not 
entitle him to immunity because the statute only applied to foreign states 
and their nonperson agencies or instrumentalities.48  In 2010, the Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit.49  The Court’s landmark 
decision effectively split the doctrine of foreign immunity into two parts:  
(1) the immunity of a foreign state and its nonperson agencies, 
 
 42. The year before the Rosenberg Statement’s controversial recommendation of 
immunity for the ISI officials, the United States conducted more than sixty drone strikes in 
Pakistan and sent a team of Navy SEALs into the country to kill Osama Bin Laden. See, e.g., 
The Data Team, Drone Strikes:  Cause or Effect, ECONOMIST (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart-drone-attacks-and-
terrorism-pakistan [perma.cc/4J74-M3AV]. 
 43. See infra Part II.B. 
 44. See, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016) 
(“[T]he district court stayed the case [for more than seven years] until a party could provide 
a declaration from the United States Department of State indicating that the action would not 
interfere with U.S. foreign policy.”); Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 
339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (“[T]he Court stayed the case 
[for nearly eight months until] the United States Department of State provide[d] the Court 
with a statement of interest on the question of whether the Moving Defendants [we]re 
immune from suit.”); see also infra Part I.C. 
 45. See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04CV1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 
1, 2007), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 
305 (2010). 
 46. See id. at *6. 
 47. Id. at *8, *15. 
 48. See Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373, 381. 
 49. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 326. 
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organizations, and instrumentalities—governed by the FSIA;50 and (2) the 
immunity of a foreign individual who acts on behalf of that state, agency, 
organization, or instrumentality—now governed by standards of federal 
common law to be determined by the district court on remand.51 
After Samantar, the federal courts that have faced a request for foreign 
official immunity have usually reverted to a version of the historic “two-
step procedure” that was used to determine foreign sovereign immunity in 
the years prior to the FSIA.52  Under step one, the foreign government 
could request immunity directly from the State Department.53  If the 
Executive decided that immunity was appropriate, the Justice Department 
would convey that determination to a court in a statement of interest.54  
Prior to the FSIA, these “suggestions of immunity” with respect to foreign 
sovereign immunity were binding and viewed as dispositive on the 
immunity request.55  But in the years since Samantar, the Second and 
Fourth Circuits have split on the amount of deference that should be 
accorded to State Department suggestions of foreign official immunity.56 
Under step two, the foreign government could request immunity directly 
from a court.57  Whether step one was required before a foreign defendant 
could proceed with step two remains uncertain, however, because the pre-
FSIA procedure did not clearly divide authority between the executive and 
judicial branches.58  Under pre-FSIA federal common law,59 courts were 
empowered to decide immunity “in the absence of recognition” by the 
Executive.60  But the courts were also required to make that determination 
“in conformity to the principles” of the State Department.61  The resulting 
 
 50. See id. at 325. 
 51. See id. at 325–26. 
 52. See id. at 311; Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 771; Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 3d 
486, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 53. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311; see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 
03-MDL-1570 GBD, 2015 WL 4879070, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015). 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012) (“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the 
Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the 
United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the 
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United 
States.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“It is therefore 
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to 
allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.”); 
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (“The certification and the request that 
the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts.”). 
 56. See infra Part I.C. 
 57. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311; see also In re Terrorist Attacks, 2015 WL 4879070, 
at *3. 
 58. See infra Part II. 
 59. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36 (“[T]he foreign government may also present its claim 
of immunity by appearance in the suit and by way of defense to the libel.”); see also 
Bellinger, supra note 40, at 832 (“Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, a foreign government 
generally had the option to seek a resolution of its sovereign immunity claim either before 
the State Department or before the court.”). 
 60. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587; see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311. 
 61. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34–35; see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312. 
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tension and unclear division of control between the executive and judicial 
branches was one of the primary issues the FSIA was enacted to resolve.62  
After Samantar, this same procedural confusion returned, and the tension 
quickly intensified, when the Executive asserted primary control over all 
determinations of foreign official immunity and effectively declared that 
step one was mandatory before a foreign defendant could proceed to step 
two.63 
B.  The Executive Upsets the Balance 
Almost immediately after Samantar, the Executive sought a leading role 
over all requests for foreign official immunity.64  In 2011, the year after the 
decision, the State Department’s Legal Advisor, Harold Hongju Koh, 
declared that Samantar had vested primary control over determinations of 
foreign official immunity with the Executive.65  Koh’s interpretation of the 
Samantar holding was based on the Court’s dicta that “[w]e have been 
given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to 
eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding 
individual official immunity.”66 
The Legal Advisor’s broad assertion of control based on the language in 
Samantar is questionable.67  While the Court declared that “the common 
law” governed foreign official immunity68 and recounted the historic two-
step procedure,69 it did not express an opinion about the appropriate balance 
of authority between the Executive and Judiciary and certainly did not 
declare that the Executive alone should make foreign official immunity 
determinations.70  Nevertheless, the following year, the Justice Department 
invoked the same ambiguous language from Samantar to make the 
 
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT, with page numbers as reprinted] (“A principle purpose of this 
bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the 
judicial branch.”). 
 63. See infra Part I.B. 
 64. See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Koh, supra note 22, at 1141–42 (“In the Samantar case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the immunity of foreign government officials . . . is not controlled by 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, but rather, by immunity determinations made 
by the Executive Branch.”). 
 66. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323. 
 67. See Rutledge, supra note 33, at 605 (“While the [doctrine of foreign official 
immunity] (whether statutory or common law) might take into account the executive 
branch’s views (or even defer to them), no area of law to my knowledge depends on the 
executive branch’s interpretation to define its very content.”); infra Part III. 
 68. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325. 
 69. See id. at 311. 
 70. See id. at 325–26; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.  In the State 
Department’s own report outlining the pre-FSIA common law of foreign sovereign and 
foreign official immunity, the Department recognized that “[g]enerally, the foreign state had 
the option to litigate its immunity claim before the Department or before the court.” 
Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, 1977 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, app. at 1019. 
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Executive’s strongest and most destabilizing assertion of authority over the 
doctrine to date.71 
In April 2012, after Pakistan sought immunity for the ISI and its two 
officials, the district court stayed the proceedings and invited the views of 
the State Department.72  Seven months later, the Executive submitted the 
Rosenberg Statement, a ten-page73 document that declared the ISI immune 
under the FSIA and the Pakistani officials immune under the doctrine of 
foreign official immunity.74  The statement was prepared by the Justice 
Department and was based in large part on a letter from Koh, the State 
Department Legal Advisor, to the Justice Department’s Principal Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Stuart Delery.75  In the Rosenberg Statement, 
the Executive analyzed the ISI’s immunity request and concluded that the 
spy agency was entitled to have the allegations against it dismissed 
“because it is a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA and no 
exception to immunity applies.”76  The statement also recommended 
immunity for the Pakistani officials based on Koh’s “determination of the 
Department of State that [the officials] enjoy immunity from suit.”77  The 
Koh Letter declared that the “complaint contain[ed] largely unspecific and 
conclusory allegations” that only challenged the ISI directors’ “exercise of 
their official powers as officials of the Government of Pakistan.”78  “In light 
of these circumstances,” Koh wrote, and “taking into account principles of 
immunity articulated by the [e]xecutive [b]ranch in the exercise of its 
constitutional authority over foreign affairs . . . the Department of State has 
determined that [the officials] enjoy immunity from suit.”79 
The Koh Letter80 and Rosenberg Statement established a new legal 
standard in federal common law and are eerily similar to a famous State 
 
 71. See Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 9 n.5. 
 72. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 73. Compare Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 9–11 (devoting less than three 
pages to the analysis of the ISI officials’ common law immunity claim), with Statement of 
Interest of the United States at 23–35, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (No. 05 Civ. 10270 (WHP)) (devoting nearly twelve pages to the analysis of the 
Israeli official’s acts and the merits of his immunity claim). 
 74. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 11. 
 75. See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Stuart F. 
Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 17, 2012), attached as 
Exhibit 1 to Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16 [hereinafter Koh Letter]. 
 76. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 6.  Whether it was appropriate for the 
Executive to determine the applicability of the FSIA to the ISI is beyond the scope of this 
Note; however, most likely, a court is not required to defer to such a determination because 
one of the purposes of the FSIA was “to transfer primary responsibility for deciding ‘claims 
of foreign states to immunity’ from the State Department to the courts.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 
560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2010)); see also infra Part III.C. 
 77. Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 22, at 1152. 
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Department letter from sixty years before.81  In 1952, the acting State 
Department Legal Advisor, Jack Tate, also sent a letter (“the Tate Letter”) 
to the Justice Department outlining new rules regarding the immunity of 
foreign states.82  In the Tate Letter, the State Department announced the 
adoption of a new and more restrictive policy of awarding immunity.83  The 
new policy required a complicated analysis of the nature of a foreign state’s 
conduct that was unclear and could sometimes be used to justify immunity 
for nonlegal or political reasons.84  The letter caused such confusion that the 
Executive itself almost abandoned the new theory.85  As a result, the State 
Department and courts struggled to apply the Tate Letter consistently, and 
Congress was forced to restore clarity through the FSIA.86 
The Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement are just as disruptive.  Like the 
Tate Letter, they assert a new and mandatory State Department policy that 
would empower the Executive with controlling authority over such 
traditional judicial tasks as evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint or 
analyzing the nature of a defendant’s conduct.87  Combined with the 
requirement that all requests for immunity be submitted to the State 
Department in the first instance, the statements have inserted an unclear 
political element into federal common law that jeopardizes the impartiality 
of the foreign official immunity doctrine.  The courts are already in conflict. 
C.  Confusion in the Courts 
On September 30, 2013, more than seven months after the Koh Letter 
and Rosenberg Statement were filed, the court sided with the Executive and 
awarded immunity to the ISI and Pakistani officials.88  The Rosenberg 
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit and argued that the State 
Department’s immunity determination was invalid and not dispositive 
because the allegations against the ISI officials related to conduct that 
violated jus cogens norms.89  The plaintiffs argued that the officials could 
not receive immunity—and therefore the State Department’s 
recommendation was not controlling—because the provision of material 
and financial support to terrorists can never be considered official or state 
 
 81. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. 
Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. 
BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also infra Part II.B. 
 82. See Tate Letter, supra note 81. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See infra Part II.B. 
 85. See Kevin P. Simmons, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:  Giving the 
Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 549 (1977). 
 86. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 312–13 (2010); infra Part II.B. 
 87. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344–45 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 89. See Pasha, 577 F. App’x at 23.  Jus cogens norms “are norm[s] accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.” Id. (quoting Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 
1286 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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sanctioned.90  Therefore, the plaintiffs argued, the foreign official immunity 
doctrine does not protect officials who engage in such acts.91 
The plaintiffs supported their appeal by citing to Yousuf v. Samantar,92 a 
Fourth Circuit decision that was issued a mere ten days before the Koh 
Letter and Rosenberg Statement were submitted by the Executive.93  In 
November 2012, in a continuation of the same Samantar case the Supreme 
Court had decided in 2010,94 the Fourth Circuit declared that State 
Department immunity determinations were not entitled to absolute 
deference95 and—contrary to the views of the Executive96—foreign 
officials were not entitled to immunity for conduct that violated jus cogens 
norms.97  When the same argument was used by the Rosenberg plaintiffs at 
the Second Circuit, the court rejected their appeal and, splitting with the 
Fourth Circuit, stated:  “‘[I]n the common-law context, [the Second Circuit] 
defer[s] to the Executive’s determination of the scope of immunity’ and ‘[a] 
claim premised on the violation of jus cogens does not withstand foreign 
[official] immunity.’”98  The Second Circuit’s decision effectively cut 
federal common law into two camps.99  After Rosenberg, foreign official 
defendants in the Second Circuit are entitled to immunity based on the 
views of the Executive.  Foreign official defendants in the Fourth Circuit, 
however, do not receive such automatic protection because the State 
Department’s views regarding conduct-based immunity are not dispositive, 
and jus cogens violations are not protectable.100 
In the aftermath of the circuit split and less than two years after the Koh 
Letter and Rosenberg Statement, another foreign official defendant sought 
immunity in the Second Circuit.101  This time, however, no party requested 
 
 90. See Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5–6, Pasha, 577 F. 
App’x 22 (No. 13-4334-CV), 2014 WL 582901, at *5–6. 
 91. See id. 
 92. 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 93. See Pasha, 577 F. App’x at 23; Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 763. 
 94. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 95. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773. 
 96. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Samantar v. Yousuf, 135 S. 
Ct. 1528 (2015) (No. 13-1361), 2015 WL 412283, at *18 (“The court of appeals also 
committed legal error in declining to rest its determination of non-immunity on the specific 
grounds set forth in the Executive Branch’s Statement of Interest, and instead fashioning a 
new categorical judicial exception to immunity for claims alleging violation of jus cogens 
norms.”). 
 97. See Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773, 778. 
 98. Pasha, 577 F. App’x at 23 (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 99. Compare id., with Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773, 777, and Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 
2016 WL 373716, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016). 
 100. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to resolve the circuit 
split. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015) (denying certiorari).  The Executive, 
which opposes the views of the Fourth Circuit, recommended that the Court deny certiorari 
because “[t]he judgment of the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court’s denial of 
petitioner’s immunity, is therefore consistent with the Executive Branch’s immunity 
determination, and it properly disposes of the immunity issue in this case.” Brief for the 
United States, supra note 96, at 12. 
 101. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), 2015 WL 
4879070, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015). 
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a statement of interest from the Executive, and the court was forced to 
decide whether it was bound by the Rosenberg Statement.102  In August 
2013, the former head of two Saudi Arabian charities sought dismissal from 
an action brought by the victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
which alleged he had sent financial and other material support to Osama 
Bin Laden and al Qaeda in the years prior to the attacks.103  The In re 
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001104 plaintiffs argued that the Saudi 
official’s immunity request was procedurally improper and should be 
denied because the court was not allowed to award immunity that was not 
first requested from the State Department.105  After evaluating the 
Rosenberg Statement, Samantar, and the history of foreign immunities in 
general, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and the Executive’s new 
policy.106  The court awarded immunity to the former official based on its 
own analysis of the allegations in the complaint and its determination that 
the acts alleged were taken in the foreign official’s official capacity.107  An 
alternative argument that the Saudi official’s conduct was unlawful, and 
thus not entitled to immunity, was also rejected because “[s]uch an 
assertion is merely an artful way of implicating the jus cogens doctrine, 
which is not recognized by the Second Circuit as an exception to common 
law [foreign official] immunity.”108 
The court also supported its decision to reject the Rosenberg Statement 
by examining two recent district court immunity determinations.  In Moriah 
v. Bank of China Ltd.109 and Rishikof v. Mortada,110 district courts granted 
immunity to foreign officials in cases where the officials had not first 
petitioned the State Department.111  The In re Terrorist Attacks court’s 
rejection of the Rosenberg Statement remains controversial, however, 
because the plaintiffs in Moriah and Rishikof did not raise an objection to 
immunity based on the Rosenberg Statement,112 and the In re Terrorist 
Attacks plaintiffs did not appeal the Saudi official’s award of immunity to a 
higher court.113 
The conflict over the Executive’s assertions in the Rosenberg Statement 
highlights the need for clarification of federal common law in this area.  In 
the Second Circuit, State Department immunity determinations are entitled 
to absolute deference.114  Therefore, because the Koh Letter and Rosenberg 
Statement have only articulated a new State Department policy, In re 
 
 102. See id. at *3–4. 
 103. See id. at *1. 
 104. No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), 2015 WL 4879070 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015). 
 105. See id. at *3–4. 
 106. See id. at *4. 
 107. See id. at *5–6. 
 108. Id. at *6. 
 109. 107 F. Supp. 3d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 110. 70 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 111. See Moriah, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 278; Rishikof, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 12. 
 112. See Moriah, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 274; Rishikof, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 10–11. 
 113. See In re Terrorist Attacks, 2015 WL 4879070. 
 114. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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Terrorist Attacks arguably does not violate Second Circuit precedent.115  
But the policy rejection—and the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Yousuf116—is 
in tension with federal common law, which, as Samantar declared, should 
govern foreign official immunity determinations.117  Under step two of the 
pre-FSIA analysis, “the courts may decide for themselves whether all the 
requisites of immunity exist . . . in conformity to the principles accepted by 
the department of the government charged with the conduct of our foreign 
relations.”118  The Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement adopted two new 
principles:  (1) a foreign official was not entitled to immunity unless and 
until the Executive had the first opportunity to decide the request; and (2) 
courts are not supposed to determine whether a foreign official acted in an 
official capacity.119  Viewed from that perspective, the In re Terrorist 
Attacks court’s grant of immunity may have violated Samantar because the 
justification for immunity was not a “ground of immunity . . . which it is the 
established policy of the [State Department] to recognize.”120 
Days before this Note went to press, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed 
Yousuf,121 the 2012 decision that the Rosenberg plaintiffs relied on in their 
appeal to the Second Circuit.122  In Warfaa v. Ali,123 the Fourth Circuit 
denied common law foreign official immunity to another former Somali 
military leader accused of committing atrocities that violated jus cogens 
norms.124  The Warfaa court avoided addressing the rift Yousuf caused with 
the executive branch125 by declaring that the court was bound to apply 
Fourth Circuit precedent in the same way the court in Rosenberg v. 
Pasha126 avoided the hard question of whether immunity was appropriate 
for alleged jus cogens violations by the ISI officials.127  Nevertheless, the 
soft circuit split that existed in the aftermath of Pasha has now hardened 
and will likely remain until the Supreme Court or Congress resolves it.128 
 
 115. In the Fourth Circuit, the Rosenberg Statement’s assertions would probably receive 
the same noncontrolling deference as an immunity determination. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 
699 F.3d 763, 773, 777 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010). 
 118. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945). 
 119. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 120. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36). But see infra Part 
III.C (arguing Hoffman is no longer applicable). 
 121. See Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016). 
 122. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 123. No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016). 
 124. See id. at *6. 
 125. See Brief for the United States, supra note 96, at 18. 
 126. 577 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 127. See Warfaa, 2016 WL 373716, at *6 (“One panel’s ‘decision is binding, not only 
upon the district court, but also upon another panel of this court—unless and until it is 
reconsidered en banc.’” (quoting Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 
(4th Cir. 1975))); Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We are bound to 
follow that precedent, unless and until it is overruled implicitly or expressly by the Supreme 
Court, or by this Court sitting in banc.”). 
 128. If Warfaa is appealed to the Supreme Court, the Executive may once again choose to 
recommend that the Court deny certiorari for the same reasons it recommended denial in 
Yousuf. See Brief for the United States, supra note 96, at 12.  On the other hand, because the 
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The law needs clarification.  In the five years since Samantar, the 
Judiciary has been in a fight with itself and the Executive.  Two circuits are 
on opposite sides regarding the deference owed to executive determinations 
of immunity and the type of conduct entitled to protection.  The Executive 
has made a weakly supported grab for control over the entire process, only 
to have a district court reject that assertion in a way that appears to conflict 
with the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the subject.  The disarray 
is clear and requires a remedy.  Fortunately, the history of foreign sovereign 
immunity serves as a useful case study. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF A SOLUTION:  FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AS AN ANALOGY TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT 
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the President, Congress, and the 
Supreme Court worked together to clarify and implement a workable 
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine.129  The conflict involved two parts:  
the circumstances when a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity for 
(1) acts inside the sovereign’s borders; and (2) acts outside the sovereign’s 
borders.  In 1964, the Supreme Court clarified the first situation when it 
reaffirmed130 the federal common law act of state doctrine that granted 
immunity to a foreign sovereign for acts performed inside its borders.131  
Immunity for acts performed outside the foreign sovereign, however, 
proved intractable under federal common law because the analysis was 
complicated132 and the division of authority among the branches of 
government forced the Executive into “the awkward position of a political 
institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the 
courts.”133  In 1976, with full support from the State Department, Congress 
enacted the FSIA and empowered the courts with exclusive authority to 
decide requests for foreign sovereign immunity.134 
In essence, a statute was necessary because federal common law was not 
able to support a doctrine that awarded immunity to a foreign state for 
conduct that occurred outside its territorial borders, because the scope and 
 
State Department did not make an immunity determination in Warfaa, the Executive may 
recommend the Court grant certiorari to determine whether it was appropriate for the Fourth 
Circuit to “fashion[] a new categorical judicial exception to immunity for claims alleging 
violation of jus cogens norms.” Id. at 18. 
 129. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6605; see also infra Part II.B. 
 130. See infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text. 
 131. Under the act of state doctrine, a foreign sovereign is totally immune from suit in 
U.S. courts for all government actions that occur within the sovereign’s territory. See Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); see also Natalie A. Turchi, Note, 
Restructuring A Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around:  Can Holdout Creditors Ever 
Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 2186 (2015) (discussing application of 
the act of state doctrine to sovereign debt cases). 
 132. See infra Part II.B. 
 133. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6607; see also infra Part II.B. 
 134. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6604–07; see also Daniel P. Roy III, Note, 
(Don’t) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity, Baby:  The Application of Agency 
Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1289–94 
(2015) (discussing the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and enactment of the FSIA). 
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complexity of the immunity analysis yielded inconsistent results.135  
Immunity for acts occurring within a sovereign’s borders is governable by 
federal common law under the act of state doctrine because the relevant 
inquiry focuses on a straightforward question of locational identity:  where 
the act occurred.136  Immunity for acts outside the sovereign’s borders is 
more complicated because it focuses on the nature of the act:  whether the 
conduct is considered public or private.137  As a result, immunity 
determinations for acts outside a sovereign’s borders often hinge on 
particularized facts, and a clear set of guidelines—which a common-law 
based doctrine struggles to provide—was necessary to achieve consistency.  
As the analogy in this part shows, a common law solution can work for 
individual official immunity that is based on nothing more than identity—
such as head-of-state or consular immunity.  But immunity that is based on 
the nature of a foreign entity’s conduct is too complicated to be governed 
by federal common law. 
This part examines the disarray that once existed in the federal common 
law of foreign sovereign immunity, the solution that was adopted to resolve 
that conflict, and the similarities between that history and the current 
conflict within the doctrine of foreign official immunity. 
A.  The Roots of Foreign Sovereign and Foreign Official Immunity 
in American Jurisprudence  
The reciprocal practice where the United States does not subject a foreign 
sovereign to suit in U.S. courts was first recognized as a matter of federal 
common law by Chief Justice John Marshall’s historic decision, Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon.138  In 1810, the French Navy commandeered a 
privately owned American ship as it sailed across the Atlantic Ocean.139  
When the ship’s former owners learned that their hijacked vessel was 
anchored in the port of Philadelphia after seeking shelter during a storm, 
they sued the French government to recover the ship.140  To their dismay, 
the district court dismissed their claim when the Executive intervened and 
recommended immunity for the French government.141  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the dismissal142 and 
established the federal common law of foreign sovereign immunity under 
principles of international law and the then-current custom of absolute 
 
 135. See infra Part II.B. 
 136. See infra Part II.A. 
 137. See infra Part II.B. 
 138. 11 U.S. 116 (1812); see also Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010).  The 
doctrine of foreign official immunity can also be traced to cases from the 1790s involving an 
early form of the conduct-based immunity argument. See generally Keitner, supra note 23, at 
749–50 (examining six civil suits brought against current or former foreign officials that 
involved statements of interest by the Executive). 
 139. See Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 117. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. at 118–19. 
 142. Id. at 147. 
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immunity.143  For more than a century, the judicial branch looked to 
customary international law to grant foreign states near-total amnesty from 
the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts.144 
Almost ninety years after Schooner Exchange, the act of state doctrine 
was first introduced.  The doctrine extended immunity to all acts of a 
foreign state—including the personal protection of an individual—when the 
acts were performed inside the sovereign’s territorial borders.145  In 
Underhill v. Hernandez,146 an American citizen living and working in 
Venezuela during the Revolution of 1892 was detained by a Venezuelan 
military leader.147  When the American was freed and returned to the 
United States, he filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against the 
official for false imprisonment, assault, and battery.148  The district and 
circuit courts awarded immunity,149 and the Supreme Court affirmed under 
the act of state doctrine.150  Because the Venezuelan official had acted in an 
official capacity, and the tortious conduct occurred entirely inside the 
territorial boundaries of Venezuela, the Court famously declared that “the 
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government 
of another done within its own territory.”151  After Underhill, federal 
common law granted absolute immunity to a foreign state for all acts within 
its borders, including the personal immunity of an individual when his or 
her actions were considered the acts of the sovereign.152 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, federal common law evolved again 
when the Supreme Court started giving tremendous deference to the 
Executive in cases involving foreign affairs.153  As the world entered a new 
era of global commerce, foreign sovereigns and private individuals began to 
interact in more frequent and significant ways.154  In response to a rise in 
 
 143. See id. at 136–39; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 
486 (1983). 
 144. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486; Wuerth, supra note 31, at 924–25. 
 145. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“The immunity of 
individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in 
the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders, 
must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of 
fact.”). 
 146. 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
 147. See id. at 578–79. 
 148. Id. at 578. 
 149. Id. at 583 (“[T]he acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of 
Venezuela, and, as such, are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another 
government.”). 
 150. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 254. 
 151. Id. at 252. 
 152. See id.; see also In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[I]mmunity is a personal 
right.  It derives from and remains an ‘attribute of state sovereignty.’” (quoting In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1987))); Statement of Interest, supra note 22, at 7 
(“The immunity protecting foreign officials for their official acts ultimately belongs to the 
sovereign rather than the official.”). 
 153. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1913–16 (2015). 
 154. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6605. 
1790 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
litigation involving foreign defendants, and the lack of a clear system that 
could be used to assert immunity, the Court established the famous two-step 
procedure155 that allowed a foreign state to petition the State Department or 
a court for a determination of immunity.156  In the aftermath of Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins157 and disputes with the Executive over New 
Deal legislation, the Court also moved away from federal common law’s 
reliance on customary international law and judge-made determinations of 
immunity.158  Instead, the Court looked to the views of the Executive and 
focused on whether immunity was consistent with the practices and policies 
of the State Department.159  The trend toward absolute deference 
culminated with two controversial160 World War II-era decisions:  Republic 
of Mexico v. Hoffman161 and Ex parte Republic of Peru,162 in which the 
Court declared that immunity determinations by the Executive were 
controlling and “must be accepted by the courts.”163 
By the early 1950s, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was an 
imperfect blend of executive and judicial authority, but the system worked 
relatively well because the law was built on the stable foundation of 
absolute immunity.164  Under the absolute theory of immunity, the analysis 
focused on identity:  if the defendant was a foreign state, it usually was 
entitled to immunity.  That stability was shattered, however, when the 
absolute theory of immunity was replaced by the new restrictive theory.165  
Overnight, the doctrine’s bedrock principle of analysis changed, and the law 
devolved into a mess of politics, confusion, and uncertainty.166 
B.  The Tate Letter and Conflict in the Doctrine 
of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
In 1952, the United States joined a majority of other nations and adopted 
the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.167  The State 
Department’s Tate Letter announced that the Executive would no longer 
 
 155. See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 
68, 74 (1938) (“[I]t is open to a friendly government . . . to claim [its] immunity from suit, 
either through diplomatic channels or, if it chooses, as a claimant in the courts of the United 
States.”). 
 156. See supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 
62, at 6606. 
 157. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (limiting the scope of federal common law). 
 158. See Wuerth, supra note 31, at 926–27. 
 159. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6606. 
 160. See infra Part III.C. 
 161. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
 162. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
 163. Id. at 589. 
 164. Tension between the executive and judicial branches was minimal because the 
analysis focused on whether the entity requesting immunity was a recognized foreign 
sovereign. See, e.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 33–34. 
 165. See Tate Letter, supra note 81.  The absolute theory is also known as the classical 
theory. See id. 
 166. See infra Part II.B. 
 167. See Tate Letter, supra note 81. 
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endorse a foreign state’s assertion of immunity for acts considered private, 
commercial, or nonofficial.168  The policy took immediate effect and 
controlled immunity determinations made by both the State Department and 
the Judiciary.169  This shift, however, complicated the immunity doctrine 
because the governing standards that identified conduct that was 
“nonsovereign” or “commercial” were unclear and required a careful 
analysis of the plaintiff’s allegations.170  The disarray was further 
compounded by the holdings in Hoffman and Ex parte Peru,171 because the 
branch that had the most expertise evaluating the nuances of “nonofficial” 
or “private” conduct172 was bound to accept the immunity determinations of 
a highly political branch that lacked “the machinery to take evidence, to 
hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review.”173 
After the Tate Letter, foreign defendants would often petition the State 
Department for a suggestion of immunity under step one of the two-step 
procedure,174 then exert political pressure for a recommendation that was 
entitled to absolute deference in the courts.175  The State Department 
struggled to make impartial decisions, and “[o]n occasion, political 
considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity 
would not have been available under the restrictive theory.”176  As a result, 
politics sometimes interfered with the legal rights of private litigants, and 
immunity determinations were made on nonlegal grounds, under procedures 
that did not ensure due process.177  Litigants also suffered from a lack of 
information because the justifications for immunity were usually short, and 
“very often no indication was given as to why immunity was 
recognized.”178 
The Executive’s inconsistent application of the restrictive theory also had 
ripple effects in the courts because judges were required to render immunity 
determinations in accordance with the State Department’s unclear 
policies.179  Under step two, when a foreign state wanted to avoid political 
considerations—or the Executive entirely—it could petition a court 
 
 168. See id. (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or 
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).”).  
Interestingly, the letter also incorrectly commented on the decisional tug-of-war between the 
executive and judicial branches when it observed “that a shift in policy by the executive 
cannot control the courts.” Id. at 985; see also supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 169. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983). 
 170. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010); Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487. 
 171. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 172. See infra Part IV.B. 
 173. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6607. 
 174. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 176. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983). 
 177. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6606. 
 178. Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, supra note 70, at 1022; 
see also supra note 73. 
 179. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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directly.180  But courts struggled to apply a clear standard, and due process 
concerns persisted as courts were forced to defer to executive 
determinations that sometimes broke with clear precedent.181  In Victory 
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General182 and Petrol Shipping Corp. v. 
Kingdom of Greece,183 for example, the Second Circuit denied immunity on 
the grounds that a contract to transport grain was a commercial act.  Five 
years later, in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India,184 the same 
court was forced to reverse itself and award immunity under nearly 
identical circumstances, because the State Department decided that the 
transportation of grain was a sovereign act, entitled to immunity.185 
For more than ten years, the doctrine limped along.  Finally, in the mid-
1960s, the executive and legislative branches agreed that the law was 
broken and a statutory fix was necessary.186  In 1976, after almost twenty-
five years of case-by-case determinations made by two rival branches of 
government, Congress enacted the FSIA.187  The statute codified the 
restrictive theory and placed full authority over foreign sovereign immunity 
determinations with the courts.188  It helped free the Executive from 
diplomatic pressure to engage in horse-trading for suggestions of immunity 
by removing political considerations from the analysis.  The FSIA also 
helped the courts by placing the law under a set of clear statutory guidelines 
to ensure immunity was granted for only legal reasons that were subject to 
appellate review.189  It was a remarkable success.190 
C.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
Congress had two primary goals when it enacted the FSIA.  First, it 
wanted to clarify the law by establishing “when and how parties can 
maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the 
United States.”191  Second, and more importantly, it wanted to eliminate the 
disarray in federal common law that necessitated the need for a statute in 
the first place by “facilitat[ing] and depoliticiz[ing] litigation against 
 
 180. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, supra note 70, at 
1019; see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487–88. 
 181. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487–88. 
 182. 336 F.2d 354  (2d Cir. 1964). 
 183. 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 184. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 185. These cases demonstrate the challenge that conduct-based determinations of 
immunity present.  In some circumstances, an agreement to transport grain is a commercial 
act (e.g., a government program that supports for-profit businesses); in other circumstances, 
it is a sovereign act (e.g., during a crop failure to ensure enough food is available to a 
community).  Liability often hinges on a fact-based determination. 
 186. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6608. 
 187. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010). 
 188. See id. 
 189. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). 
 190. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
in Perspective:  A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 318 (1986). 
 191. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6604. 
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foreign states[,] and . . . minimiz[ing] irritations in foreign relations arising 
out of such litigation.”192 
Under “the pre-existing common law”193 that the FSIA set out to fix, 
immunity determinations represented “a devil’s choice”194 that placed the 
United States in a lose-lose situation.  Foreign countries could use the two-
step procedure to pressure the State Department into awarding immunity in 
circumstances that were not consistent with the restrictive theory.195  The 
second- and third-order effects of such political or foreign policy-motivated 
immunity determinations not only harmed private litigants, but also made 
diplomacy more difficult.196  When the State Department engaged in horse-
trading or awarded immunity on questionable legal grounds, relations with 
third-party states could suffer when those uninvolved states were denied 
immunity in the future under similar circumstances.197  The nonreciprocal 
nature of the situation also compounded the lose-lose dynamic because the 
United States usually could not obtain the same sort of case-by-case 
preferential treatment in the justice systems of other countries.198  In the 
United States, a decision to deny immunity had significant drawbacks 
because foreign states knew that immunity was an option, and the denial 
could be viewed as an unfriendly act.199  Likewise, a decision to grant 
immunity also had drawbacks because the decision could cause tension 
with uninvolved parties,200 make future diplomacy or immunity 
determinations more difficult, and negatively impact the ability of a private 
litigant to obtain recourse.201  The FSIA corrected that lose-lose dynamic 
when it eliminated step one of the two-step procedure. 
 
 192. Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of State, and Harold R. Tyler, 
Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Carl O. Albert, Speaker, H.R. (Oct. 31, 
1975), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6634. 
 193. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010). 
 194. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States:  Hearings on H.R. 11315 
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 26 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State) 
[hereinafter Leigh Statement]. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 26–27. 
 197. E.g., the transportation contracts in Victory Transport and Isbrandtsen Tankers. See 
supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Leigh Statement, supra note 194, at 27 (“In virtually every other country in the 
world, sovereign immunity [wa]s a question of international law decided exclusively by the 
courts and not by institutions concerned with foreign affairs.”). 
 199. E.g., in the context of the Rosenberg Statement, if the ISI directors were not granted 
immunity, Pakistan could become less cooperative with U.S. interests in the region. See 
supra note 42. 
 200. E.g., after learning that the ISI officials were granted immunity, India released a 
statement saying “the decision of the US authorities in this case is a cause of serious 
disappointment.” Aditi Phadnis, Expressing Concern:  India Disappointed Over ISI’s 
Immunity in US Civil Suit, EXPRESS TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/ 
481746/expressing-concern-india-disappointed-over-isis-immunity-in-us-civil-suit/ 
[perma.cc/DWV5-2AAA]. 
 201. E.g., the victims of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 
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For the most part, the FSIA works remarkably well202 because the 
executive and judicial branches work together in a way that employs the 
expertise and constitutional authority of each.203  The Executive plays a 
minor role through its recognition power and authority to designate state 
sponsors of terrorism.204  The courts play the dominant role based on their 
expertise interpreting statutes, applying the law, and evaluating the 
sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint.205 
The FSIA converts a judge-made or political decision into a statutory 
interpretation question under straightforward and relatively clear 
guidelines.206  The statute awards immunity to a foreign state for all acts, 
minus certain specified exceptions such as waiver, commercial activity, or 
state sponsors of terrorism.207  While complications sometimes arise over 
whether an exception applies, the doctrine is stable and consistent because 
the FSIA is interpreted and applied by the courts based on precedent and 
subject to appellate review.208  The statute gives the doctrine the stability it 
lacked under federal common law.209 
The FSIA is also admirable because of its impact on international law 
and the immunity doctrines adopted by other nations.210  The statute was 
the first of its kind and served as a model for the immunity laws in other 
countries.211  Since 1976, many states have actually gone a step further and 
codified the immunity of foreign officials in the same statutory structure as 
the immunity of foreign sovereigns.212  The United States, however, 
appears to be in a situation analogous to the late 1960s and early 1970s:  its 
doctrine of foreign official immunity is in disarray, while the legal systems 
of many other countries have evolved to incorporate the immunity of 
foreign individuals under comprehensive and nonpolitical statutory 
doctrines.213 
 
 202. See Feldman, supra note 190. 
 203. See infra Part IV. 
 204. See infra Part III.B. 
 205. See infra Part IV.B. 
 206. The FSIA is also interesting because the statute intentionally transfers authority to 
the judicial branch.  Most of the time, when Congress codifies federal common law under a 
new statute, the new law has the effect of limiting judicial discretion.  In many ways, the 
FSIA does the opposite. 
 207. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). 
 208. See Feldman, supra note 190. 
 209. Cf. supra Part I. 
 210. See Feldman, supra note 190, at 303. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property (Dec. 2, 2004).  As of February 6, 2016, there are twenty-eight 
signatories and twenty-one ratifications of the U.N. Jurisdictional Immunities Convention.  
The United States has not joined. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3& 
lang=en (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/EY72-5W94]. 
 213. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. 
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 232–48, 252; 
Rutledge, supra note 33, at 589. 
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III.  THE GRACEFUL EXIT:  AGAINST EXECUTIVE BRANCH MONOPOLY 
OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS 
The State Department’s role in the doctrine of foreign official immunity 
is the subject of much ongoing debate and scholarly work.214  This part 
discusses the justifications the Executive has given for that role and its 
authority to make the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement’s assertions of 
control. 
In the 2015 decision, Zivotofsky v. Kerry,215 a divided Supreme Court 
affirmed the executive branch’s exclusive authority to grant formal 
recognition to a foreign sovereign.216  The decision was limited to a specific 
situation that did not involve foreign official immunity; but the Court’s 
treatment of the proper role of the Executive in matters involving foreign 
affairs helps inform the discussion about the proper role of the Executive in 
matters involving foreign official immunity because the Executive justifies 
its assertions of control by invoking “its constitutional authority over 
foreign affairs.”217 
Zivotofsky is especially relevant if executive authority over foreign affairs 
in the context of foreign official immunity is viewed as a function of its 
recognition power.218  The State Department, however, has wisely avoided 
making such an argument because the constitutionality of the FSIA,219 
which would infringe on that exclusive authority, cuts against the 
Executive’s assertions in the Rosenberg Statement.220  Nevertheless, 
Zivotofsky’s majority and dissenting opinions cast doubt on the Rosenberg 
Statement even under the broader “foreign affairs power,” because absolute 
control by the executive branch is extreme and in conflict with the 
constitutional system of checks and balances.221 
This part examines arguments in favor of executive control.  Part III.A 
explores federal common law and draws parallels between the two types of 
 
 214. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 40, at 829; Bradley & Helfer, supra note 213, at 258; 
Koh, supra note 22, at 1142; Rutledge, supra note 31, at 909; Wuerth, supra note 31, at 975. 
 215. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 216. See id. at 2086.  The vote was six-to-three (Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was 
joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; Justice Breyer filed a 
concurring opinion; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part; Justice Roberts’s dissent was joined by Justice Alito; and Justice Scalia’s dissent was 
joined by Justices Roberts and Alito). 
 217. Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 2.  The Executive has also indicated the recognition 
power as a justification for control over immunity determinations. See, e.g., Statement of 
Interest, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
 218. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2089; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 213 (1962) (stating 
“it is the executive that determines a person’s status as representative of a foreign 
government”); Bradley & Helfer, supra note 213, at 258. 
 219. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1983); 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004). 
 220. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 31, at 932. 
 221. See infra Part III.B; see also Celidon Pitt, Note, Fair Trade:  The President’s Power 
to Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the 
Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837, 2842–62 (2015) (examining the constitutional balance 
of power between the executive and legislative branches). 
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foreign official immunity and the two theories of foreign sovereign 
immunity discussed in Part II.  Part III.B evaluates the scope of the 
Executive’s “constitutional authority over foreign affairs”222 through the 
lens of Zivotofsky.  Part III.C examines Supreme Court precedent and 
considers the dual World War II-era decisions223 that the Executive invokes 
to assert the binding nature of its immunity determinations.  Informed by 
this new examination of federal common law, the Constitution, and 
Supreme Court precedent, this part concludes that the Rosenberg 
Statement’s assertion of total control is inappropriate as well as imprudent. 
A.  Status- and Conduct-Based Immunities 
Foreign official immunity can be classified into two types:  (1) immunity 
based on an individual’s status, and (2) immunity based on an individual’s 
conduct.224  Status-based immunities apply to individuals such as sitting 
heads of state or diplomats and extend to the individual based on the unique 
position he or she occupies on behalf of the foreign state.225  Conduct-based 
immunities, on the other hand, apply to an individual’s acts and are derived 
from the foreign state’s delegation of responsibility to the official to operate 
within a certain scope of authority.226  Similar to the relationship between 
the absolute and restrictive theories of foreign sovereign immunity, the two 
types of individual immunity are closely related to each other, but are just 
different enough to cause complications with their application under federal 
common law.227 
Status-based immunity focuses on the identity of the individual and is 
similar to the absolute theory.228  Immunity based on status protects a 
foreign official if the individual is a member of a certain group—similar to 
the way the absolute theory once protected a defendant if it was deemed a 
foreign sovereign.229  Conduct-based immunity, on the other hand, focuses 
on the individual’s acts and is similar to the restrictive theory that was 
codified by the FSIA.230  Immunity based on conduct protects a foreign 
official when the nature of the acts in question are “official” or are 
attributable to the sovereign.  It does not protect an individual when the acts 
are considered private or personal—similar to the restrictive theory’s 
“public versus commercial” distinction.231 
 
 222. Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 2. 
 223. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); Ex parte Republic of 
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943). 
 224. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 774 (4th Cir. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66 (1965); Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign 
Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 63 (2010). 
 225. See Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 774. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See supra Part I. 
 228. See supra Part II.A. 
 229. See supra Part II.A. 
 230. See supra Part II.B. 
 231. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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The similarity of the two types of individual immunity to the two theories 
of sovereign immunity helps inform a solution to the current disarray in the 
doctrine of foreign official immunity.232  Under the absolute theory, the 
system of executive determinations of state immunity worked well partly 
because the question that decided whether immunity was appropriate—
whether the defendant was a foreign sovereign—was a question very 
similar to recognition and well within the Executive’s scope of authority 
and expertise.233  When the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign 
immunity replaced the absolute theory, the doctrine fell into disarray 
because the relevant question was no longer as straightforward.234  Under 
the restrictive theory—and in a conduct-based immunity analysis—the 
critical inquiry asks whether the acts alleged in the complaint are “official” 
or “private.”  The problematic nature of an inquiry that evaluates the 
nuances of conduct was the very reason the restrictive theory did not work 
as a matter of federal common law and had to be codified by the FSIA.235 
B.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry and Executive Authority 
Over Foreign Affairs 
The State Department’s primary justification for control over foreign 
official immunity determinations is grounded in the Executive’s 
constitutional authority over foreign affairs.236  Courts are usually very 
deferential to the President in cases that affect foreign policy237 because the 
Constitution gives the Executive tremendous power in the context of 
foreign affairs, and foreign relations requires “one voice” that “must be the 
President’s.”238  The Executive, however, is not given absolute control.239  
As with nearly all areas of the law, the Constitution tempers the power it 
gives to a single branch through the system of checks and balances.240  
Executive control over foreign affairs is limited by congressional authority 
over such areas as spending, treaty ratifications, and declarations of war241 
and is further limited by the judicial branch’s authority of review.242 
Less than a year ago, the Court provided a lengthy discussion about the 
Executive’s foreign affairs power.  In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held 
that an act of Congress requiring the State Department to list “Jerusalem, 
Israel” on U.S. passports was an unconstitutional intrusion on the 
 
 232. See supra Part I.C. 
 233. See infra Parts III.B, IV.A. 
 234. See supra Part II.B; infra Part III.C. 
 235. See supra Part II.B. 
 236. See Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 7; Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 2. 
 237. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 153, at 1900. 
 238. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 239. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008); Sitaraman & Wuerth, 
supra note 153, at 1902–03. 
 240. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090. 
 241. See id. at 2087; see also Pitt, supra note 221, at 2842–44. 
 242. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 153, at 1902–03. 
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Executive’s exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns formally.243  
In its discussion, the Court repeatedly observed that the Executive did not 
have absolute control over the conduct of foreign relations because the 
system of checks and balances gave Congress the authority to act in ways 
that limit the Executive’s ability to act internationally.244 
The six-to-three decision was limited to the circumstances in question 
because the majority and dissent did not agree about whether the passport 
requirement implicated the recognition power.245  The case is still helpful to 
the discussion about the Executive’s role over foreign official immunity 
determinations, however, because of the similar ways in which the majority 
and dissent characterized the Executive’s authority over foreign affairs.246  
In essence, both sides agreed that the Executive is entitled to deference in 
the conduct of foreign relations because in that context, “assurances cannot 
be equivocal” and “[f]oreign countries need to know, before entering into 
diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States, [information such 
as] whether their officials will be immune from suit in federal court.”247  
That being said, both sides also agreed that even though the Executive 
should have tremendous authority over foreign affairs, that authority is still 
subject to checks and balances by the other branches of government.248  
Moreover, where the Executive has asserted absolute control over an aspect 
of foreign affairs—such as recognizing a foreign state—the Court indicated 
that Congress has a responsibility to check and balance that assertion 
through its own law-making powers.249 
The Rosenberg Statement’s assertion of total control over foreign official 
immunity is open to doubt in light of the Court’s analysis of the Executive’s 
scope of authority over foreign affairs.  While the Executive certainly has 
authority to declare an entity a foreign sovereign to which the FSIA or 
federal common law could grant immunity, the system of checks and 
balances dilutes the Executive’s authority actually to take unilateral action 
on that recognition250 because the Executive does not have “unbounded 
 
 243. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 244. For example, Congress can stymie diplomatic relations by refusing to authorize 
funds for construction of an embassy or approve the nomination of an ambassador. See id. at 
2087. 
 245. Compare id. at 2086, with id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and id. at 2118 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 246. See id. at 2084 (majority opinion) (stating “[l]egal consequences follow formal 
recognition” and recognized sovereigns “may benefit from sovereign immunity when they 
are sued”); id. at 2112 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating 
“[i]mportant consequences are understood to flow from one state’s recognition of another 
[such as the ability to] invoke sovereign immunity”). 
 247. Id. at 2086 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2113–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(expressing “serious doubts” that the Executive’s recognition power is entitled to absolute 
deference). 
 248. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion); id. at 2107 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2126 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 249. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion). 
 250. See id. at 2088. 
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power” over all aspects of foreign affairs.251  The Executive’s authority 
actually to act on the recognition it makes must be tempered in some way 
by the other branches of government.252  Therefore, an immunity doctrine 
where “it is for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether 
the conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official’s official capacity”253 is 
probably too extreme to fit under the scope of the Executive’s foreign 
affairs power. 
Congress is the most appropriate body to temper the Executive.  Under 
current federal common law as it relates to foreign official immunity, the 
courts are already too deferential to sufficiently check and balance the 
Executive’s authority.254  The clearest example of that undue deference can 
be seen in the weight that is still given to the pre-Tate Letter decisions, 
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, decisions that, after the shift to the restrictive 
theory, should no longer control and which one renowned legal scholar 
believes “were wrongly reasoned—if not wrongly decided.”255 
C.  Hoffman and Ex parte Peru Under the Restrictive Theory 
of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
While the Executive probably does not have the constitutional authority 
to assert the degree of control over foreign official immunity determinations 
that it has,256 even if the Rosenberg Statement is retracted, a thorny issue 
remains because the Executive can still invoke Hoffman and Ex parte Peru 
to achieve a similar outcome.257  Under 28 U.S.C. § 517, the Executive 
may, sua sponte, submit a statement of interest in any pending litigation.258  
Under Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, the courts are required to defer to 
executive branch determinations of immunity.259  Therefore, because 
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru appear to be binding,260 the Executive can still 
assert control over foreign official immunity determinations in a way that 
remains unchecked and unbalanced. 
Such a sleight of hand, however, should not be available to the Executive 
because Hoffman and Ex parte Peru are not applicable under the restrictive 
theory of foreign sovereign immunity and should not be binding on the 
 
 251. Id. at 2089; see also id. at 2115–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 252. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion); id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] sound 
structure of balanced powers [is] essential to the preservation of just government, and 
international relations form[] no exception to that principle.”). 
 253. See Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
 254. See, e.g., supra Part I.C; infra Part III.C. 
 255. Wuerth, supra note 31, at 921. 
 256. See supra Part III.B. 
 257. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 54. 
 259. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311–12 (2010) (quoting from Hoffman and 
Ex parte Peru); see also Doe v. De León, 555 F. App’x 84, 85 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied 
sub nom. Jane Doe 1 v. Ponce De León, 135 S. Ct. 78 (2014); In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 
599 (9th Cir. 1992); Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1981); 
Weixum v. Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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courts.261  Hoffman and Ex parte Peru were decided in the pre-FSIA era of 
absolute immunity when foreign states (and their officials) were entitled to 
immunity simply because the states were recognized as foreign 
sovereigns.262  Under the absolute theory, mandatory deference was 
appropriate263 because immunity depended on identity and/or recognition—
traditional areas of executive branch authority and expertise.264  But when 
the Executive embraced the restrictive theory through the Tate Letter and 
supported its codification under the FSIA, the Executive waived its right to 
the sort of absolute control Hoffman and Ex parte Peru allowed.265 
After the FSIA, foreign sovereign immunity is restricted to certain types 
of conduct.266  Because the statute vested sole authority in the courts to 
make that conduct-based analysis, a suggestion of immunity from the 
Executive regarding a foreign state’s immunity should not be binding 
because the FSIA explicitly eliminated the role of the Executive from such 
determinations.267  That same logic should extend to modern day 
determinations of foreign official immunity because the immunity of 
foreign individuals flows out of the immunity of the foreign state.268  
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru’s mandatory deference under the restrictive 
theory is invalid because the decisions applied to immunity under the 
absolute theory, and the Tate Letter and FSIA changed the foundational 
immunity question.269  If the courts are not required to submit blindly to 
executive recommendations of foreign sovereign immunity, it is illogical to 
require mandatory deference to determinations of foreign official immunity 
that necessitates the same conduct-based immunity analysis that the FSIA 
purposefully took away from the Executive.270 
While the Supreme Court in Samantar did observe that “[w]e have been 
given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to 
eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding 
individual official immunity,”271 the shift from the absolute theory to the 
restrictive theory—that is to say, the Tate Letter, not necessarily the 
 
 261. See Wuerth, supra note 31, at 924 (arguing “that the Court’s cursory reasoning in Ex 
parte Peru and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman is unconvincing in the light of the text and 
structure of the Constitution”). 
 262. See supra Part II.A. 
 263. But see supra note 261. 
 264. See infra Part IV.A. 
 265. See Wuerth, supra note 31, at 928. 
 266. See supra Part II.C. 
 267. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 849 (2011); supra note 152. 
 269. Mandatory deference to executive determinations of foreign official immunity under 
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru is also doubtful because the two cases were actions in rem and in 
admiralty—circumstances that are very different from typical foreign official immunity 
cases like Samantar and Rosenberg that involve tortious acts by a foreign individual. See, 
e.g., Wuerth, supra note 31, at 928. 
 270. Deference to executive determinations of status-based immunity is still appropriate. 
See infra Part IV.A. 
 271. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323 (2010). 
2016] A STATUTORY FIX TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY  1801 
FSIA—changed the State Department’s role in determinations of foreign 
state and foreign official immunity.  Therefore, Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, 
which only applied in the pre-Tate Letter era of the absolute theory, and 
were partly to blame for the disarray that necessitated the FSIA in the first 
place,272 are not applicable in the current era of the restrictive theory.273 
IV.  THE FIX:  THE BEST SOLUTION GIVES 
AUTHORITY TO THE EXPERTS 
The first step toward solving a problem is admitting that one exists.  
Currently, the courts and Executive are locked into an unnecessary and self-
defeating tug-of-war that Congress must acknowledge and regulate.274  The 
circumstances are ripe to codify the doctrine under a foreign official 
immunity statute because the Executive has overplayed its hand with the 
Rosenberg Statement,275 and the resulting disarray should help focus 
attention on the problem in a way that compels action.276  For purely 
pragmatic reasons, the Executive should unilaterally retract the Rosenberg 
Statement’s assertions of control and seek only an advisory role in foreign 
official immunity determinations because Executive authority over pending 
litigation actually makes diplomacy more difficult.277  In the meantime, the 
courts should evaluate foreign official immunity requests in the same 
manner as In re Terrorist Attacks and treat Executive suggestions of 
immunity as just that—suggestions.278 
This part argues in favor of a statute that places foreign official immunity 
determinations under a procedure similar to foreign sovereign immunity.  A 
foreign official immunity statute still would allow the Executive to assert 
varying degrees of influence—not control—over judicial determinations of 
 
 272. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. 
 273. The Judiciary’s current deference to Hoffman and Ex parte Peru also demonstrates 
that a nonstatutory fix, such as the application of customary international law to federal 
common law, is not the best way to resolve the current disarray. Cf. Wuerth, supra note 31, 
at 975–76. 
 274. See supra Part I.C. 
 275. See supra Part III.B. 
 276. The Executive’s lack of a role in the act of state doctrine provides additional support. 
See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 213, at 258 (“[I]n a closely analogous context—judicial 
development of the common law governing the act of state doctrine—the Supreme Court has 
declined to treat as dispositive the Executive’s views concerning the contours of that law, 
and a majority of Justices have also balked at the idea of giving absolute deference to the 
Executive in the case-specific applications of the doctrine.”). 
 277. E.g., Former State Department Legal Advisor Davis Robinson has recounted a story 
that underscores the problem with executive control over immunity determinations. See 
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 44.  In the 1980s, Secretary of State George Schultz 
met with Chinese President Deng Xiaoping to discuss payment of Chinese prerevolutionary 
debts. See id.  During the meeting, President Deng became “highly annoyed” about an 
attachment order that was issued against a Chinese 747 aircraft and said, “Why don’t you 
just call that judge down in Alabama and tell him to lay off the People’s Republic of China.” 
Id.  Schultz replied, “Oh, we have the separation of powers, you have to understand.” Id.  
President Deng asked, “Well, what is the separation of powers?” Id.  Schultz answered, “I’ll 
send you my lawyer [i.e., the legal advisor] to explain it.” Id. 
 278. See supra notes 101–14 and accompanying text. 
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immunity279 by:  (1) offering its general views on a legal question as an 
amicus curiae; (2) arguing in favor of a specific result as an interested party; 
or (3) taking specific action within its authority that has ripple effects on the 
courts—such as placing a state on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List to 
deny FSIA protection,280 or recognizing an individual as a head of state.281  
The overall effect of a statute would eliminate the Executive’s ability to 
dictate judicial action, such as the Koh Letter’s award of immunity and 
dismissal of the ISI officials, for conduct-based immunity determinations 
but not for determinations of status-based immunity.282 
A.  Status-Based Immunity to the Executive 
Status-based foreign official immunity determinations are basically acts 
of recognition283 that fall under the Executive’s Article II, section 3 power 
to “receive ambassadors and other public ministers.”284  As a result, 
executive suggestions of status-based immunity are more appropriately 
viewed as executive recognitions of immunity that are “‘a quintessentially 
executive function’ for which absolute deference is proper.”285  Therefore, a 
new statute should vest authority for determinations of status-based 
immunity with the Executive. 
B.  Conduct-Based Immunity to the Judiciary 
Determinations of conduct-based foreign official immunity should be 
vested with the courts because the judicial branch has the most experience 
and expertise in evaluating conduct.  Moreover, the history of foreign 
sovereign immunity demonstrates that a clear standard, subject to review by 
a higher authority, and applied by a nonpolitical body, is the most effective 
system.286 
Similar to the way the Federal Tort Claims Act287 requires the U.S. 
government to take responsibility for “the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment,”288 conduct-based immunity determinations 
should force a foreign sovereign to take responsibility for the harmful acts 
of its officials.289  When a foreign individual seeks immunity for conduct 
 
 279. See Rutledge, supra note 31, at 887. 
 280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012). 
 281. See supra Part III.A; infra Part IV.A. 
 282. See supra Part III.A; infra Part IV.A; see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 
768 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The extent of the State Department’s role, however, depends in large 
part on what kind of immunity has been asserted.”). 
 283. See Rutledge, supra note 33, at 605–06. 
 284. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see also Keitner, supra note 224, at 71. 
 285. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 772 (quoting Rutledge, supra note 33, at 606). 
 286. See supra Part II.C. 
 287. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 268 (“[T]he burden should be on the defendant to 
ensure that his or her government is made aware of the legal proceedings[] and intervenes in 
a timely fashion.”). 
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that he or she performed on behalf of a foreign state, the immunity that is 
awarded is best viewed as the immunity of the foreign sovereign because 
the actions of the individual are essentially the actions of the state.290  
Sometimes, when a foreign official seeks immunity, the analysis that is 
conducted is incomplete because it only asks whether the foreign official’s 
conduct was “official conduct” in the sense that it could be taken on behalf 
of the foreign state.  Analysis that only inquires whether conduct could be 
official does not determine whether the foreign state actually takes 
responsibility for such conduct.  Such analysis is problematic because it 
does not require the foreign state affirmatively to declare that the foreign 
official’s alleged conduct, if proven, was state sanctioned.  A foreign 
official immunity statute can fix that by requiring a state affirmatively to 
extend its immunity before an official is entitled to protection.291 
Consider two examples.  In Matar v. Dichter,292 an Israeli military 
officer was sued for allegedly authorizing the bombing of a building in 
Gaza that killed Palestinian civilians.293  The official was awarded 
immunity, however, after the Israeli government effectively stepped into his 
shoes and took responsibility for the decision to bomb.294  The allegations 
of wrongdoing by the official were dismissed because the official’s conduct 
was attributable to the state, and under the FSIA, the tortious act that was 
alleged in the complaint was a sovereign act entitled to immunity.295 
In Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba,296 on the other hand, Pakistan was 
never required to take responsibility for the allegations of providing 
financial and material support to the Mumbai terrorists.297  The State 
Department determined that the ISI officials should receive immunity 
because the Executive itself viewed the allegations in the complaint as 
official acts.298  Pakistan was not forced to declare affirmatively that, if 
proven, the act of providing financial and material support to LeT would 
constitute a sovereign act.  Conduct-based immunity probably should not be 
available to foreign officials without an affirmation by the foreign state to 
extend its sovereign immunity over the alleged acts of its officials.299  The 
 
 290. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324 (2010). 
 291. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 292. 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 293. See id. at 287; see also supra Part I. 
 294. Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (“[T]he State of Israel has represented to this Court 
that Dichter’s actions were taken ‘in the course of [his] official duties, and in furtherance of 
official policies of the State of Israel.’” (quoting Letter from Daniel Ayalon, Ambassador of 
Isr. to the U.S., to Nicholas Burns, Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, Dep’t of State (Feb. 6, 
2006), attached as Exhibit A to Declaration of Jean E. Kalicki, id. (No. 05 Civ. 10270 
(WHP)), ECF No. 19)). 
 295. See id. 
 296. 980 F. Supp. 2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. 
App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 297. See id. at 343. 
 298. See Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 1. 
 299. Pakistan would still be entitled to immunity under the FSIA even if it had declared 
that the act of providing financial and material support to LeT was official because the 
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ratification process for a foreign official immunity statute would force a 
debate over whether the sovereign itself must take responsibility, as Israel 
did in Matar and as the United States does under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, or whether the courts may impute responsibility and decide for 
themselves when a foreign official is “acting within the scope of his office 
or employment,”300 as the State Department did in Rosenberg.  The 
ratification process would also be an excellent opportunity to resolve the 
split between the Second and Fourth Circuits regarding immunity for jus 
cogens violations.301 
CONCLUSION 
A statute that codifies foreign official immunity is good for everyone.  
For Congress, it enables oversight of the State Department and protects the 
legal rights of private individuals.  For the Executive, it eliminates the strain 
that foreign official immunity requests currently place on diplomatic 
relations.  For the Judiciary, it brings order to the law and gives courts and 
litigants a clear idea of the legal playing field.  A statutory fix also benefits 
the weak and marginalized victims of a foreign state who are the litigants 
most likely to be harmed by an unclear immunity doctrine because they 
most likely cannot compete with the lobbying and legal power of the 
sovereign. 
History has a habit of repeating itself.  The United States should not be 
forced to wait another twenty-five years for a statute to resolve disorder 
created by executive overreach.  Congress must act. 
   
 
Executive has not designated Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. See supra note 280 and 
accompanying text. 
 300. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). 
 301. See supra Part I.C. 
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APPENDIX 
 
PROPOSED FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES ACT 
 
A BILL 
 
To define the jurisdiction of United States courts in suits against foreign 
officials, the circumstances in which foreign officials are entitled to 
immunity, the circumstances in which execution may not be levied on their 
personal property, and for other purposes. 
 
SECTION 1.  SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Foreign Official Immunities Act of 
20xx.” 
 
SECTION 2.  FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. 
For purposes of this chapter—, 
(a) Congress makes the following findings—, 
(1) In some circumstances, foreign officials, by virtue of the 
position they hold on behalf of a foreign state, are 
entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the United States and of the States; 
(2) In some circumstances, foreign officials, by virtue of the 
actions they take on behalf of a foreign state, are entitled 
to dismissal from a civil action brought in the courts of 
the United States and of the States; and 
(3) In all circumstances, the judiciary is the most appropriate 
body to render final and binding determinations of 
immunity that affect the legal rights of parties to a civil 
action brought in the courts of the United States and of 
the States. 
(b) The purpose of this bill is to—, 
(1) Establish the circumstances in which a foreign official 
may be awarded immunity and dismissed from a civil 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 
(2) Establish the circumstances in which a foreign official 
may be awarded immunity and dismissed from a civil 
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted; and 
(3) Vest all foreign official immunity determinations with 
the courts of the United States and of the States in 
conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter. 
 
SECTION 3.  DEFINITIONS. 
For purposes of this chapter—, 
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(a) A “foreign official” is any individual who is—, 
(1) a natural person; 
(2) an officer of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b); 
and 
(3) neither a citizen of the United States nor of a State of the 
United States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of the 
United States Code, nor created under the laws of any 
third country. 
(b) An “officer of a foreign state” is any individual who—, 
(1) is an official, so designated by a foreign state as defined 
in subsection (c); 
(2) acts on behalf of a foreign state as defined in subsection 
(c); 
(3) acts in an official capacity; and 
(4) acts within the scope of his or her official responsibility. 
(c) A “foreign state” is any entity that—, 
(1) may be awarded immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //; and 
(2) seeks to extend its immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. // to the 
actions of the individual seeking immunity under this 
statute. 
(d) The “United States” includes all territory and waters, 
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
 
SECTION 4.  IMMUNITY OF AN OFFICIAL FROM JURISDICTION. 
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United 
States is a party, the following foreign officials, designated by the 
President and while holding the indicated office, shall be immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States for all official conduct taken on behalf of a foreign state 
entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //, except as provided in section 6 of 
this chapter—, 
(a) sitting heads of state; 
(b) sitting foreign ministers; 
(c) diplomats; and 
(d) members of special diplomatic missions. 
 
SECTION 5.  IMMUNITY OF AN OFFICIAL FROM SUIT. 
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United 
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act, a foreign 
official, acting within the scope of his or her office or employment 
and on behalf of a foreign state entitled to immunity under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //, 
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shall be entitled to dismissal in the courts of the United States and of 
the States for all official conduct taken within the scope of his or her 
office or employment, except as provided in section 6 of this chapter. 
 
SECTION 6.  EXCEPTIONS TO IMMUNITY. 
A foreign official shall not be immune under this chapter in any 
case—, 
(a) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either 
explicitly or by implication; or 
(b) in which the foreign state has not officially petitioned the 
court for immunity on behalf of the foreign official; or 
(c) in which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–
11 et seq. //. 
 
SECTION 7.  EXTENT OF LIABILITY. 
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign official is 
not entitled to immunity under section 6 of this chapter, the foreign 
official shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances including for punitive 
damages. 
 
SECTION 8.  COUNTERCLAIMS. 
In any action brought by a foreign official, or in which a foreign 
official intervenes, in the courts of the United States or of the States, 
the foreign official shall not be accorded immunity with respect to 
any counterclaim—, 
(a) for which a foreign official would not be entitled to immunity 
under section 6 of this chapter had such claim been brought 
in a separate action against the foreign official; or 
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the claim of the foreign official; or 
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief 
exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by 
the foreign official. 
 
SECTION 9.  SERVICE; TIME TO ANSWER; DEFAULT. 
The requirements of service, time to answer, and default shall apply 
to a foreign official in the same manner as those that apply to a 
foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //. 
 
SECTION 10.  IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT AND EXECUTION OF 
PROPERTY OF A FOREIGN OFFICIAL. 
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United 
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act, the property in 
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the United States of a foreign official shall be immune from 
attachment, arrest, and execution, except as provided in section 11 of 
this chapter. 
 
SECTION 11.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE IMMUNITY OR INDEMNITY FROM 
ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION. 
The property in the United States of a foreign official used for a 
commercial activity in the United States as defined in the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. // shall not 
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, 
upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State 
after the effective date of this Act, if such an exception to immunity 
from attachment or execution is not recognized for a foreign state by 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et 
seq. //. 
 
SECTION 12.  CERTAIN TYPES OF PROPERTY IMMUNE FROM EXECUTION. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 11 of this chapter, the 
property of those individuals designated by the President as being 
entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided 
by the International Organizations Immunities Act // 22 U.S.C. § 288 
// shall not be subject to attachment or any other judicial process 
impeding the disbursement of funds to, or on the order of, a foreign 
official as the result of an action brought in the courts of the United 
States or of the States. 
 
SECTION 13.  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. 
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, 
the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the 
Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or 
application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable. 
 
SECTION 14.  EFFECTIVE DATE. 
This Act shall take effect ninety days after the date of its enactment. 
 
DRAFTING NOTES 
This statute only applies to natural persons who act in some sort of 
official capacity on behalf of a foreign state that is itself entitled to 
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  Judicial analysis of 
a foreign individual’s request for dismissal under this statute should begin 
with an examination of the foreign state that has petitioned the court for 
immunity on behalf of the foreign individual.  If the court determines that 
the foreign state is entitled to protection under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, the court should then consider whether the foreign official 
is entitled to status-based immunity under section 4, or conduct-based 
immunity under section 5.  If the foreign official is entitled to status-based 
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immunity under section 4, the court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the allegations against the foreign official and must 
dismiss the suit.  If the foreign official seeks conduct-based immunity under 
section 5, the court should engage in a thorough analysis of the merits of the 
affirmative defense.  If conduct-based immunity is appropriate, the court 
must dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
Section 4 intentionally omits the requirement that international 
agreements be in place prior to enactment of this statute to give Congress 
and the Executive the flexibility to modify the scope of status-based 
immunity through future international agreements. 
